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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
C&Y CORP,, a Utah corporation,: 
ROBERT A. CONDIE, an : 
individual, and JAMES YARTER, : 
an individual, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellants. : 
V S . J 
GENERAL BIOMETRICS, INC., a : 
Delaware corporation; : 
VENTANA GROWTH FUND, a J 
California limited partner- : 
ship, and THOMAS GEPHART, : 
an individual, : 
Defendant/Appellees. : 
: Court of Appeals 
: No. 940340-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in issuing inconsistent 
findings of fact and conclusions of law? Questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness without any special deference to the 
trial court. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1. v. 
Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiffs 
offer of $400,000 down and $100,000 in 120 days was not a "cash 
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offer?" Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are 
without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by 
an erroneous view of the law. Western Capital & Sec. . Inc. v. 
Knudsvia, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 
688 (Utah 1989). 
3. Did the trial court err in determining that the subject 
contract between C&Y Corporation, Robert A. Condie and James 
Yarter ( hereinafter collectively referred to as "C&Y Corpor-
ation") and Defendant General Biometrics, Inc. ("GenBio") for the 
purchase and sale of the MRC Division was not within the scope of 
the GenBio Board of Directors prior approval of the sale of the 
MRC Division? Questions of law are reviewed for correctness 
without any special deference to the trial court. Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Felan, 744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah 
1987). 
4. Did the trial court err in determining that Mr. Gephart 
did not have the apparent authority to enter into a contract with 
the Plaintiffs for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division? 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness without any special 
deference to the trial court. Western Kane County Special Serv. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Felan. 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
5. Did the trial court err in determining that there was 
no contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division between 
C&Y Corporation and Defendant GenBio? Questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness without any special deference to the 
trial court. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
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Felan. 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a complaint filed by C&Y Corporation 
against GenBio, Ventana Growth Fund ("Ventana") and Thomas 
Gephart for breach of an agreement for the purchase and sale of 
GenBio7s MRC Division, unjust enrichment, disregard of corporate 
entity and negligent misrepresentation. (R. 1-47). Defendants 
GenBio and Ventana counterclaimed against Plaintiffs alleging 
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropria-
tion of corporate opportunity. (R. 54-70). GenBio filed a motion 
for summary judgment asserting that as a matter of law no 
contract existed between the parties for the purchase and sale of 
the MRC Division. (R. 124-25). C&Y Corporation filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment that a binding contract did exist as 
a matter of law. Both motions were denied by the trial court. 
(R.713-14). Approximately one week prior to the beginning of 
trial, this case was transferred from Judge Rodney Page to Judge 
Jon Memmott. 
Thereafter, this matter was brought to trial before the 
court, sitting without a jury, and the trial court granted 
Defendants' Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, motion 
against C&Y Corporation on all causes of action in the Complaint, 
with the exception of the negligent misrepresentation claim 
against Thomas Gephart. The Court subsequently ruled in favor of 
Mr. Gephart, finding that Mr. Gephart had not negligently 
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misrepresented a presently existing material fact. In addition, 
the Court found in favor of Mr. Condie cmd Mr. Yarter on all 
causes of action set forth in the Defendants' Counterclaim, 
ruling that neither Mr. Condie nor Mr. Yarter breached any 
fiduciary duties they may have owed to GenBio or misappropriated 
any corporate opportunity. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
GenBio was formed on April 20, 1987 by merging Microbio-
logical Research Corporation with Datagene, Inc. Microbiological 
Research Corporation was an independent company located in 
Bountiful, Utah. From its beginning, GenBio has been dominated 
and controlled by Defendant Ventana, and its general partners, 
Thomas Gephart and Duwaine Townsen. (R. 1593). Ventana has been 
able to dominate and control GenBio because of Ventana's 
ownership of the single largest block of voting stock (R.1585, 
1592) and control over other voting stock, which gives Ventana 
control of a super-majority of the stock of GenBio, and because 
of the amount of loans made to GenBio. Over the history of 
GenBio, Ventana has kept GenBio solvent by loaning it millions of 
dollars, for which warrants were issued. (R. 1587). Without the 
constant influx of loans from Ventana, GenBio would have ceased 
to exist long ago. GenBio would not have been able to meet its 
payroll, pay suppliers, or continue its research in the Immunodot 
project. GenBio is a research and development company whose 
future success or failure is dependent entirely on the Immunodot 
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project. 
In addition, Ventana has controlled the board of directors 
of GenBio by appointing or removing directors at its discretion. 
Ventana also has prevented all shareholders meetings and has not 
allowed any information to be sent to the shareholders, including 
financial information. (R. 1592). Not a single director of 
GenBio ever has been elected by the shareholders. (R. 1592-93). 
However, the bylaws of GenBio require annual shareholder meetings 
and that directors be elected by the shareholders. 
Because of Ventana's control and the enormous amounts of 
loans made to GenBio, Ventana, through its managing partners 
Gephart and Townsen, has treated GenBio as its own. Not a single 
action of any significance has been taken without the approval of 
Gephart or Townsen and many actions were taken at the insistence 
of these two persons without board approval. For example, when 
a dispute arose between the officers, it was not the GenBio Board 
of Directors which resolved the dispute, but Gephart. (R.1593). 
A dispute arose between Norm Monson, who was the president of the 
company, and Mr. Yarter, who was a director of GenBio at that 
time. (R.1593). It was Gephart who made the decision to 
terminate Monson. (R. 1593). In addition, it was Gephart who 
made the decision to hire John Gordy as president of GenBio, not 
the Board of Directors. (R.1593). Gephart was neither an officer 
or director of GenBio when he made these decisions. Control of 
the decisions to hire and fire key officers is but one example of 
the way Gephart treated GenBio and how he considered GenBio to be 
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his own. 
In mid-1989, Ventana decided to sell the MRC Division of 
GenBio located in Bountiful, Utah. At this time, GenBio took the 
necessary steps to separate the MRC Division from the rest of 
GenBio. Separate financial statements were kept for the MRC 
Division and the MRC Division became a stand-alone division. The 
purpose of breaking out MRC was to facilitate it's sale. During 
the November 30, 1989 board meeting of GenBio, the board of 
directors pre-approved the sale of the MRC Division for $500,000. 
(R. 1595). The GenBio board of directors also approved a commis-
sion schedule for John Gordy, GenBio's president, relating to the 
proposed sale. (R. 1595). If the MRC Division sold for $500,000, 
Gordy was to receive a 5% commission, up to a maximum of $50,000. 
(R.1595). 
For approximately the next year, GenBio aggressively 
attempted to sell its MRC Division, but with no success. Of the 
numerous entities contacted, only six companies showed even a 
slight interest or gave any response. Of these six companies, 
not one of them made an offer which was acceptable to GenBio. 
Even one company, Gull Laboratories, Inc. of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, refused to make any offer to purchase the MRC Division 
because it did not feel that MRC was worth buying at almost any 
price. In May 1990, after more than six months of MRC being on 
the sale block, Yarter mentioned in passing to Condie that he 
might be interested in purchasing the MRC Division. Condie and 
Yarter had no further discussions concerning their purchase of 
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the MRC Division until the end of 1990, and conceived of no plan 
to purchase the MRC Division until that time. As a matter of 
fact, in the November to December 1990 time frame, Mr. Yarter 
introduced Dr. Preston Dorsett of Viral Antigens to Townsen. 
(R.1594). Mr. Yarter was aware that Dr. Dorsett might be 
interested in purchasing the MRC Division and put Dr. Dorsett in 
touch with Townsen so they could discuss the possibility of Dr. 
Dorsett purchasing MRC. (R.1594). 
On December 13, 1990, Condie sent to Townsen an offer to 
purchase the MRC Division for $400,000. On December 16, 1990, 
Gephart called Mr. Condie at his home and told him that he was 
now chairman of GenBio and that Townsen was resigning because he 
was "burned out." However, Gephart at that time had been neither 
a director nor officer of GenBio and was not elected to the 
position of chairman by the shareholders. Gephart merely assumed 
the position consistent with his past control of GenBio. During 
the conversation between Gephart and Condie, Gephart reminded 
Condie that he controlled GenBio and that Condie knew that GenBio 
did whatever Ventana wanted. (Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p.100) 
Gephart reaffirmed his interest in selling the MRC Division and 
requested that all further communications be directed to him. 
On or about December 23, 1990, Condie called Gephart and 
made a new offer for the purchase of the MRC Division of $350,000 
down and $100,000 in six months. Gephart counter-offered with a 
sale price of $500,000, with $400,000 down and $100,000 within 
120 days. (R. 1586). Condie responded that he would consider the 
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offer and get back to Gephart with his response. 
On January 7, 1991, Condie sent a letter to Gephart 
accepting the $500,000 cash offer (attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A"). On January 9, 1991, Condie called Gephart to ensure he had 
received the letter. Gephart confirmed that he had received the 
acceptance letter, but pointed out an error in addition in 
Condie's letter. Gephart also requested that Condie do the legal 
work in order to speed up the closing. Gephart followed up this 
conversation with a letter dated January 10, 1991 to Condie again 
confirming their agreement for the purchase and sale of the MRC 
Division for $500,000 and noting the error in addition in 
Condie's January 7th letter (attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
Shortly after this conversation, Condie called Harvey 
Flodin, general counsel of both Ventana and GenBio, to arrange 
formalization of the purchase and sale of the MRC Division. 
Flodin told Condie that he had heard about the deal, but did not 
know the specifics. Flodin requested Condie to send to him the 
letters confirming the deal. 
Over the next several weeks, Condie, Rand Elison, counsel 
for C&Y Corporation, and Flodin endeavored to draft the final 
agreement. This included three drafts of an agreement and 
discussion of ancillary items. Elison prepared the first draft 
as a stock purchase due to a misunderstanding. On March 4, 1991, 
Elison sent to Flodin a final draft of the agreement, the third 
draft, and a demand for closing. On March 5, 1991, Elison 
received a letter from Flodin stating that the GenBio board of 
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directors would be meeting on March 5, 1991 and that the closing 
should occur on March 18, 1991. On March 7, 1991, Gephart called 
Condie at his home and told him that he had to go to Sweden to 
get approval from Swedish investors prior to closing. Gephart 
stated that lack of approval from the Swedes could "kill the 
deal." Gephart then told Condie that he would get back to him at 
the end of March, after his return. 
After this call with Gephart, Condie called Flodin and was 
told by Flodin that he was "getting screwed." Flodin also told 
Condie that he shouldn't talk to him anymore about the deal. On 
March 8, 1991, Condie sent a letter to Gephart and Townsen 
stating that he was prepared to close the deal on March 18, 1991. 
Elison also talked to Flodin and Yarter spoke to Townsen. On 
March 18, 1991, Condie and Yarter were ready, willing and able to 
close the deal, with money in hand. But no one from GenBio 
showed. Subsequent to this, Condie received a letter from 
Gephart stating that the GenBio board of directors had decided 
not to sell the MRC Division and that the deal had always been 
subject to board approval. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's finding that the offer made by C&Y 
Corporation did not fall within the GenBio Board's prior approval 
because it was not a "cash offer" is clearly erroneous and 
completely unsupported by the evidence admitted at trial. The 
only evidence admitted at trial was that C&Y Corporation's offer 
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of $500,000, with $400,000 down at closing and the remaining 
$100,000 to be paid within 120 days, constituted a "cash offer." 
Because the court's finding is completely unsupported by the 
evidence and against the clear weight of authority, this Court 
must set aside the trial court's finding that the agreement 
struck between the parties was not a "cash offer" and enter a 
finding consistent with the evidence, that C&Y Corporation's 
offer was a "cash offer." 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
Gephart did not have authority to consummate a contract with C&Y 
Corporation for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division. 
Gephart either had actual authority to enter the subject contract 
because of the GenBio Board's prior approval, or had the apparent 
authority to bind GenBio to the purchase and sale of its MRC 
Division to C&Y Corporation. As the trial court specifically 
found, the GenBio board of directors expressly pre-approved the 
sale of the MRC Division for $500,000. Because the agreement 
between C&Y Corporation and GenBio for the purchase and sale of 
the MRC Division was for $500,000, no further board approval was 
required. 
Regardless of whether Gephart had actual authority, Gephart 
was clothed with apparent authority in this transaction to bind 
GenBio to a contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC 
Division, under any terms. A long-standing, well recognized 
exception to the requirement of board approval is the doctrine of 
apparent authority. Under this exception, board approval is not 
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required to consummate a transaction of a party purportedly 
acting on behalf of the corporation when the person is clothed 
with apparent authority. Under the doctrine of apparent 
authority, liability is premised upon the corporations knowledge 
of or acquiescence in the conduct of its agent which has caused 
third parties to rely upon the agent's actions. In this 
instance, GenBio allowed Gephart to take took control of GenBio 
and run the company as if it was his own. Moreover, not only did 
GenBio completely acquiesce in Gephart's control, GenBio invited 
it. This is a textbook example of apparent authority. Accord-
ingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion of 
law that Mr. Gephart did not have apparent authority to bind 
GenBio to the subject contract and enter its own ruling that 
Gephart did have the apparent authority to bind GenBio to the 
purchase and sale of the MRC division. 
This Court also should reverse the trial court and hold that 
the agreement reached between the parties was sufficiently 
definite to constitute a binding contract. As a matter of law, 
the trial court erred in ruling that the agreement between the 
parties for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division was not 
sufficiently definite to constitute a contract. The agreement of 
the parties in this case is confirmed in writing, setting forth 
its terms and provisions. That writing, which speaks for itself, 
is controlling, eliminating any factual issues with respect to 
the express, unambiguous, terms and provisions thereof. It sets 
forth the essential terms of the agreement of the parties: the 
11 
sale of the assets and liabilities of the MRC Division of GenBio 
for $500,000. The price is established. The payment terms are 
established. The subject of the sale is established as the 
assets and liabilities of the MRC Division of GenBio. The 
agreement between the parties is sufficiently definite to 
constitute a binding contract. 
The Judgment in this case should be set aside by this Court 
and the case remanded for a new trial because the findings of 
fact entered by the trial court are completely inconsistent and 
cannot support the judgment. In ruling on Plaintiff's Complaint, 
and entering the findings of fact, the court found that Gephart 
did not exercise control over GenBio and, thus, did not have 
apparent authority to bind GenBio to the purchase and sale of the 
MRC Division. But in entering the findings of fact on Defend-
ants7 Counterclaim, the court made a multitude of findings that 
Mr. Gephart controlled GenBio, treated GenBio as his own company 
and that GenBio acquiesced in and invited Gephart's conduct. 
Because the findings of fact entered by the trial court are so 
inconsistent that it is not possible to determine what facts the 
court intended to find, the findings of fact cannot support the 
judgment and this Court must remand this case for a new trial 
unless the Court reverses the trial court's finding of no 
apparent authority and enters its own finding of apparent 
authority. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OFFER 
IN THIS CASE WAS NOT A "CASH OFFER." 
The trial court's finding that the agreement struck between 
the parties did not fall within the GenBio Board's prior approval 
because it was not a "cash offer" is clearly erroneous and 
completely unsupported by the evidence admitted at trial. 
Accordingly, this Coxirt should set aside the trial court's 
erroneous finding and enter a finding consistent with the 
evidence, that C&Y Corporation's offer was a "cash offer." 
If the trial court had not abused its discretion in making 
this erroneous finding, then the trial court would have concluded 
that the subject contract fell within the prior approval of the 
GenBio Board of Directors for the sale of the MRC Division. The 
trial court specifically found that on November 30, 1989, the 
GenBio Board of directors pre-approved the sale of the MRC 
Division for $500,000. 
2. At GenBio's Board of Directors Meeting 
("Board Meeting") held November 30, 1989, 
the Board authorized Mr. John T. Gordy to 
investigate the possible sale of MRC. The 
Court found the Board of Directors author-
ized Mr. Gordy to sell MRC Division for 
5500,000 or more in a cash sale. For any 
sale less than $500,000 cash, Mr. Gordy was 
instructed to bring those offers to the 
Board for Further discussion and decision. 
Ruling on Proposed Findings and Objections, f 2 (R. 1585) 
(emphasis added). However, the trial court found that because 
this was not a "cash offer," it did not fall within the prior 
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approval. (R. 1586). 
The reason GenBio required a cash sale was so that it could 
have the needed capital to conduct further research and develop-
ment of its ImmunoDot project. GenBio was not interested in 
having another company acquire the MRC Division by trading some 
of that company's stock or other assets. What GenBio wanted was 
cash to fuel the ImmunoDot research. As explained by Mr. Yarter: 
Q (By Mr. Moxley): What was your 
knowledge of the interest of the Board of 
Directors in selling MRC and putting it for 
sale during 1989-1990? 
A [By Mr. Yarter] Well, the 
Board was looking at it from the point of 
view that they needed to generate some more 
cash to support the I-Dot which was the 
future of the business. And Mr. Gordy had 
presented this as an avenue to generate more 
cash. 
Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 206. Without the influx of cash, 
there was no reason to sell the MRC Division. That is why an 
offer to sell MRC in exchange for stock was rejected. 
But the trial court found that the contract entered between 
the parties was not a cash offer because only $400,000 was to be 
paid upon closing, and the remainder of the purchase price would 
be paid by C&Y corporation paying $75,000 within 90 days after 
closing, and $25,000 to be paid 120 days after closing. This was 
the counter-offer made by Gephart and which C&Y Corporation 
accepted. However, the fact that $100,000 would be held back to 
ensure performance does not alter the nature of the transaction 
and is inconsistent with the testimony that this constituted a 
"cash offer" as desired by the GenBio Board. This did not in any 
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All witnesses who were asked I ther $400,000 paid *irnn 
closing, w: ^ , n naiil in cash within l., 1 
days, constituted .. v .*. I 1 1 1 answei 1 n 1 1 1 nimt 1 < 
Evei . :tnes c state- In n , «.M& J "I dsh oi tei . " When Mi, 
Yar^t * ~'-3ted as follows; 
A [By Mr. Yarter, 1 would say LliaL 
any time that you buy a company for cash, 
there's always a hold back. And any time 
you are going to give somebody 80% down and 
then hold back $100,000 just to make 
sure you got what you thought you got, 1 
think that's a normal situation. And I 
would consider that, as I saiid Tsic] to Mr. 
Quinn, a cash offer. 
it L.I rancii 1 ipt \ I 1 1 J U (emphasis addi'u; 
There id no, eviuiiiiu.1 uppui. n\j " liinony- The trial 
iMurt's finding that $400,000 to be paid upon closing, a*tJ 1>^ 
remain 1 ii«i 1 M - " be paid within 120 days, did not constitute 
1 '" MI mi ui I ei l" ib completely HI In iiiii iiii|i n 1 in nne record. 
Indeed, the trial court's finding is made out of whole cloth. It 
has no basis in fact or reality. Accordingly, because the trial 
court's finding that this is not a cash offer is clearly 
erroneous, it must be set aside by this Court and a finding 
entered that the $500,000 offer, with $400,000 down and $100,000 
within 120 days, was a "cash offer" and fell within the GenBio 
Board's prior approval. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
HOLDING THAT THOMAS GEPHART DID NOT HAVE THE 
AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE SUBJECT CONTRACT. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
Gephart did not have authority to consummate a contract with C&Y 
Corporation for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division. 
Because of the trial court's error, this Court should reverse the 
trial court and hold that Gephart had either actual authority or 
apparent authority to bind GenBio to the purchase and sale of its 
MRC Division to C&Y Corporation. As the trial court specifically 
found, the GenBio board of directors expressly pre-approved the 
sale of the MRC Division for $500,000. Because the agreement 
between C&Y Corporation and GenBio for the purchase and sale of 
the MRC Division was for $500,000, no further board approval was 
required. However, the trial court erroneously found that C&Y 
Corporation's offer did not fall within the pre-approved sale 
because it was not a "cash offer." But as set forth in the 
preceding section, the trial court's finding that it was not a 
cash offer is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence. 
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--<. - ; egardless of whoth^r jphart ruo M 'J-.IL 
.mi < * — ^ctned with apparent authority in this 
transact^:. * the purchase and 
sale of the MK* Division .jiiuci «*.y i<- h ny "br.'inni n ni|, well 
recocinaze* e* *ptior •, the requiremen* ~r ooard approval Is the 
doctr.. r TT~"~ * • "v« except: rd 
ty; :o\a^ is not i , ^ . i * ' / 
crte-1. - " re .,•: behalf of tne corporation wnen .**? w^.. -» 
- * " hr*r: +- \ Zions First Nat. Sank \ , 
£ Clinic Jorp., Hessler, 
v. Farr- «t 
...... r- -- * '" - **•* ":or:ty H tea ling wit* 
thira ^ * ~ 
person with authority "~ : -a :*e coi^uuiur.,; au, ^  y . — J . 
Ren i • £ Son? „w ! * <r: ir .v^l, (where a perse-
controii
 r ~ . « , ~ 7 +-hat ^ontrol 
heir :; . *a to nave ^^ wt-i i- ~* u,— 
d i r e c t o r s con 1d a u t h o r i z\ 
In WaiKei BCJIIJK U IT l i s t m . ...J.pnos, 87 2 P . 2d 7 3 (u LUII 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Apparent authority exists; "where a person 
has created such an appearance of things 
that it causes a third party reasonably and 
prudently to believe that the second party 
has the power *- a < v~- ~*lf of the first 
person , . • • 
Id. at 75 (quoting Wynn v. racnanon r. :... . 
%;; Sui ,-eme ;t ledfiinae^ _ 
^wt^ : :rs: ;*JL\ Bank v, Cxdrk Clinic Corp,.. 76 2 P ^ d 
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1090 (Utah 1988). In Zions, the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
"Where corporate liability is sought for 
acts of its agents under apparent authority, 
liability is premised upon the corporation's 
knowledge of or acquiescence in the conduct 
of its agent which has caused third parties 
to rely upon the agent's actions." 
Id. at 1095. (quoting City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-
Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983)). 
In analyzing the apparent authority of Gephart, it is 
important to understand the relationship of GenBio in the context 
of Gephart and his venture capital firm, Ventana. Gephart was 
managing partner of Ventana. Ventana is the largest single 
shareholder of GenBio voting stock and funds GenBio's existence 
with venture capital. GenBio is a hostage, an alter ego of 
Gephart and his venture capital firm. It is totally dependent 
upon them for operating funds. Without those funds, GenBio would 
be insolvent. Its revenues do not begin to cover its expenses. 
GenBio depends upon Gephart7s funding to make payroll, pay debt 
service, fund R&D, support plant and equipment, and to support 
every other aspect of its corporate existence. Absent Gephart7s 
funding, GenBio could not survive financially. 
In addition to controlling the purse strings of GenBio, 
Gephart controls the company from an ownership standpoint. He 
controls the largest single block of voting stock, nearly 24%. 
In addition, the limited partners of Ventana, which is Gephart7s 
venture capital firm, own an additional 40% to 50% of GenBio7s 
voting stock. That super-majority enables him to appoint every 
director, override any decision or action by the board of 
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directors, and discharge any director at his whim. Because of 
the super-majority of the voting stock controlled by Gepharl nl 
sharehoidei di'Livj t.ivi I M hi1 iii lismi find iiii i the company In 
er once held a formal meeting of shareholders, din^pite t hi* 
I » that the company is a public company and its bylaws require 
shell eliuldei, -n iiietsl 11n-i I I rd.st' mice annii.il 1 , ' i i mp I
 |(" stated , 
mi 111 in 11: s o t f icers AI IU director s na ve per inj Lt ed Gei iB i n i 
i fitives of Gephart and his venture capital firm and he exploits 
the i:\iril fi.l ilr r i vrrl from ownership nnrt ^incline) to dominate GenBio 
and control every material action and fleeis 11 MI the re u I I I 
to curry favor with Gephart and obtain the needed funding, G e n B m 
frpp,ly ) UP mi i t s, Gephart to control its corporate functions, 
In concluding that "I'eLeihl.ni1 l «>| Ji , j i ' ' ' ' • upparent 
authority to b«ll K . l z- make i .. •=•.*.] I III , the 
Court iqnorpd tho specific findinas vnich plain! ,' 
establish apparent - • 'firally fouinl 
numerous facts which v-->tiona* pirate Gephai' " 
ar.r?,rA"** ^ttirity n d Gentij acquiesce .n the conduct 
c: --.£-:. • ciPil i f ,s nusiness to Gephart 
and encouraged Gephart'-- . o;.i : UunBio let nothing happi 'in 
without crairung Gepnart. *- di-^horization. The Court made the 
''act: 
3. The history of the operations of GenBio 
are that there was very little consideration 
of shareholders' interests in the operation 
of GenBio and that GenBio was not run in the 
manner consistent for providing shareholder 
information. 
4, ii" "' 1 11PI ever conducted 
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any shareholders' meetings and there have 
been no election of directors by the share-
holders in the history of the corporation. 
5. Mr, Gephart and Mr. Townsen exercised a 
great deal of control over the GenBio board 
of directors in the operation of GenBio, 
however, this influence did not rise to the 
level of being a violation of law. 
6. With the exception of Mr. Condie, all 
of the GenBio directors were either em-
ployees of Ventana, consultants who had a 
relationship with Ventana, shareholders with 
another portfolio company of Ventana, or 
GenBio employees. The appointment of all 
directors were at the direction of Mr. 
Gephart or Mr. Townsen. Mr. Gephart or Mr. 
Townsen controlled who subsequent directors 
would be and controlled the appointment of 
the directors in this case. 
7. Many of the decisions to hire key 
personnel, rather them being made by the 
GenBio board of directors independently, 
were made either by Mr. Gephart or Mr. 
Townsen. Mr. Gordv, who was hired as pres-
ident, was instructed to talk to Mr. Gephart 
and Mr. Townsen rather than deal with Mr. 
Monson, who was the CEO of GenBio. At this 
time, Mr. Gephart was neither a director nor 
an officer of GenBio. 
8. When there was a dispute between the 
officers, it was Mr. Gephart who was in-
volved in the resolution of the dispute, not 
the board of directors. This included a 
dispute between Mr. Yarter and Mr. Monson, 
which resulted in the decision to terminate 
Mr. Monson. This decision was made by Mr. 
Gephart and not the board of directors. 
9. In considering the evidenced adduced on 
whether Mr. Gephart or the board made this 
decision, and the testimony of Mr. Gephart 
and what has happened in GenBio in general, 
the Court has serious reservations on the 
credibility of Mr. Gephart's testimony. Mr. 
Gephart had substantial influence in the 
operation of GenBio, but has little, if no, 
recollection on what has occurred. 
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iu, Mr. Gephart and Mi : -- -«^ n * J 7 a great. 
deal of control in t*> i- SJLJI* when to 
recall loans and the ii«, of payments, 
rather than the GenBio board of directors, 
or independent officers, being able to 
control when money was sent. The decisions 
to recall loans and the timing of payments 
were made in the best interest of Ventana, 
rather than the best interest of GenBio* 
23. During *-*-- "- >er 30, 1989 board 
meeting, the u^ - directors gave Mr. 
Gordy approval t MRC for $500,000 or 
more and that Mr Gordy would receive a 5% 
commission for the sale of the MRC Division. 
Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen also gave their 
approval to sell the MRC Division prior to 
the November 30, 1989 meeting. 
28. Although Mr Gephart did nut have 
actual authority to sell MRC, he had sub-
stantial knowledge of GenBio and the MRC 
Division and was involved in negotiations to 
sell the MRC Division, even though he was 
not a member of the GenBio board. 
29. Other efforts to sell the MRC Division 
include negotiations with Dr. Dorsett. Dr. 
Dorsett initially contacted Mr. Townsen. but 
Mr. Townsen referred him to Mr. Gephart. 
34. - HRC Division clearlj was for sale 
beginning in November of 1989. Prior ap-
proval of that sale also had been obtained 
from both Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen prior 
to it going to the board of directors for 
approval. 
Ruling :r Proposed Findings and Objections, ff **-_ 
exercise c::r per at ions- JI Genrno were a 
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Gephart was not an officer or director of GenBio. Moreover, 
Gephart negotiated the purchase and sale of the MRC Division, and 
accepted C&Y Corporation's offer, while he was not an officer or 
director of GenBio. When Condie contacted Townsen, who was the 
only possible remaining director of GenBio, to make an offer to 
purchase the MRC Division, Condie was instructed to direct all 
further discussions to Gephart. Again, Gephart was not a 
director of GenBio at this time. Mr. Condie testified at 
follows: 
A [By Mr. Condie] About two weeks 
after this letter, I believe the 22nd of 
December, it was a Sunday, Mr. Gephart 
called me at my home Sunday afternoon. 
Q And what did he say to you and 
what was your response? 
A He told me that he was now in 
charge of [GenBio]. Mr. Townsen was burned 
out. That he was going to reorganize the 
board. And if I had any further interest in 
pursuing the purchase of MRC, that he's the 
one that I should contact. 
Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 100. 
In addition, when Dr. Preston Dorsett, who is the only 
completely non-interested witness to testify at trial, contacted 
GenBio to inquire about purchasing the MRC Division, Dr. Dorsett 
was instructed to direct all communications to Gephart, who was 
not a director of GenBio at this time. Dr. Dorsett testified as 
follows: 
A [By Dr. Dorsett] I was in Memphis, 
Tennessee, at our facility. And as I re-
call, I telephoned and could not contact 
[Mr. Townsen] and he returned my call. 
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Q And during the course of ti'i.ii 
conversation, what did you say and what' n'lid 
A j told him that we were poten-
tial ly interested in MRC and acquisition of 
Kb And he indicated that we should deal 
directly with Mr, Thomas Gephart* That Mr, 
Gephart had responsibility for negotiations. 
Trial "Ii anscr.i I il "nil! III \\ In i euiphdb i -> iiilded). 
I every instance, in which a *-• i qnif icant decision faced 
4-
 v^, -^ephar"*" •* wi • controlled GenBio's course r .action. 
~e:.L . '" •" u 
h i s >w*~ :~eover o n l y d:* *M o m p l e t e l y a c q u i e s „ 
i ] --' ~ " " ~~> "^  t^"""UC"*~ 3 ' 
t •*:• This is a textbook example if apparent authority 
T - * -~>~^ .
 ir| Gephart I | i 
l i a b i l i t y i c . c o n t i a w U -ante . . jphdrt lllli'i 111 s I vnw I in | 
Gephart - ic r : t y wrier ' - u t GenBio # s p u r p o s e • 
A ~h~\:] J l I I I i i n i r t ') 
c o n e y s , . . - t . ' , ippdi r\ I 
a u t h o r i t y u ; n d GenBio * t h e s u b j e c t c o n t r a c t and e n t e r i t .. 
own r u ; : ~ ~ — + - Gerhsr*- - i i ^ h-ivp f h p a p p a r e n t a u t h o r i t y t o b i n d 
GenB- mi i i f d i d s e .11 
i l l . 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 1U RULING THAT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
W.u NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT. 
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in ruling that the 
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agreement between the parties for the purchase and sale of the 
MRC Division was not sufficiently definite to constitute a 
contract. This Court should reverse the trial court and hold 
that the agreement reached between the parties was sufficiently 
definite to constitute a binding contract. The agreement of the 
parties in this case is confirmed in writing, setting forth its 
terms and provisions. That writing, which speaks for itself, is 
controlling, eliminating any factual issues with respect to the 
express, unambiguous, terms and provisions thereof. The plain 
language of the letter agreement of Gephart slams shut any 
further argument. Gephart unequivocally declared: 
Pursuant to your January 7 correspondence 
and to our telephone conversation yesterday 
afternoon, I would like to provide a written 
acknowledgement of the agreement regarding 
the sale of assets and liabilities of MRC 
from GenBio for 5500,000. 
Letter dated January 10, 1991 (emphasis added). (Attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B"). Gephart's January 10, 1991 letter speaks for 
itself. It sets forth the essential terms of the agreement of 
the parties: the sale of the assets and liabilities of the MRC 
Division of GenBio for $500,000. The price is established. The 
payment terms are established. The subject of the sale is 
established as the assets and liabilities of the MRC Division of 
GenBio. 
The test of whether an agreement is sufficiently definite is 
whether it provides sufficient information to enable the Court to 
determine if a breach has occurred, and if so, to afford an 
appropriate remedy. That test is plainly satisfied as a matter 
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rontracr. 
- cing 
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" *" *n Sing Cheng cited I " Am Jut, 2d Con I i I «. h i, I ICJI ding: 
ks - matter of policy, the law leans against 
the destruction of contracts for uncer-
tainty . Courts favor the determination that 
an agreement is sufficiently definite. We 
will, if possible, so construe the agreement 
as to carry into effect the intention of the 
parties. 
Id, at 5R1 (emphasis added) The modern trend of the 1 aw favors 
carryliu| . . racts and 
disfavors holama their, unenforceable e, *_-> : uncertainty. 
sequent 1' 
uncei tri i 
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intention ui tae parties tnereirom. City of Maiden v> jreen• 779 
-onstrueu a manner that. - legal 
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effect. Where two constructions are possible, it will be 
construed to effectuate a valid contract. Stanal v. Todd, 554 
P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976). Consistent with these basic policy 
considerations, the well-settled law in Utah is that if an 
agreement is reached on essential terms, a binding, enforceable 
contract is created, despite the existence of ancillary and 
incidental matters that are not specifically addressed or 
concluded in the agreement. Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blachurst v. TransAmerica Ins. Co.. 699 
P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). A contract need not provide for every 
collateral matter or possible contingency. Nixon & Nixon. Inc. 
v. John New & Assoc.. Inc.. 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). 
In Barker, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a contract is 
binding so long as the parties agree to the essential terms. 
Barker involved a plaintiff who brought an action for specific 
performance of a contract for the sale of land. The contract 
provided that the plaintiff would purchase 40 acres of the 
defendants' ranch by paying $1,000 along with giving the 
defendants 80 acres of the plaintiff's 150 acre farm. The 
contract, however, provided no description of the 80 acres of 
farmland that the plaintiff was to convey and the contract 
allowed the defendant to choose, at their discretion, what 40 
acres the plaintiff would receive. Because the contract did not 
include any description of the 80 acres that the plaintiff was to 
convey to the defendants, the defendants asserted that the 
contract was too indefinite to enforce. In holding that the 
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in met was binding, the court, stated: 
mi I mi' i„ mot necessary, however, that th =i 
contract itself contain all the particulars 
of the agreement. The crucial factor is 
that the parties agreed on the essential 
elements of the contract. 
Id. at ~- , 
li in up i if jiu "I n i l i mi i 1 d i Illy h M i I  iiiiiii U l d u h u i o L * . 
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the fact that issues concerning obsolete inventors uacuilecti. 
accounts receivable, equipment leases, etc. were not addressed or 
resolved in the letter. The court concluded that the agreement 
was a binding contract because the parties had agreed to the 
essential terms. 
In Rand-Whitney, the parties agreed to the purchase and sale 
of one of the defendants corporate divisions. The defendant 
subsequently received a more favorable offer for the sale of the 
division and refused to close on the transaction, asserting that 
there was no contract because the parties had not agreed to the 
additional terms. These additional terms, included the buy back 
dates for obsolete inventory and uncollectible accounts receiv-
able, union contracts, unbooked orders from customers or 
suppliers of defendant and equipment leases. The court stated 
that these were not essential terms of the agreement to sell the 
corporate division of the defendant to the plaintiff. Because 
the parties had agreed to the essential terms of the agreement, 
the court found that the agreement was binding. 
The case law from the State of Utah, and the other parts of 
the country, uniformly holds that the mere fact that the parties 
considered the execution of a formal agreement confirming a prior 
agreement does not render the prior agreement invalid. Blachurst 
v. TransAmerica Ins., Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). The case of 
Rand-Whitney also addressed and disposes of that issue. The 
defendants in that case raised the same issue in an effort to 
abort the agreement of the parties. The court pierced through 
the letter agreement, holding that the parties' intention to 
28 
execute a formal purchase and sale agreement did not render the 
letter agreement invalid. To the contrary, the parties' intent 
to execute a formal purchase and sale agreement demonstrated that 
they felt they had an agreement to confirm: 
The fact that a further purchase and sale 
agreement was contemplated does not defeat 
the existence of a contract. 
The fact that the contemplated purchase and 
sale agreement in this case was expected to 
include additional terms, and not just 
memorialize terms already addressed and 
agreed upon, does not defeat the existence 
of a contract where, as here, the parties 
already agreed on all of the essential 
terms. 
In this case I find that contemplation of a 
future purchase and sale agreement did not 
indicate that the parties believed they were 
in a stage of preliminary negotiations. 
Rather, the anticipation of a future doc-
ument indicated, among many other things, 
that the parties felt they had an agreement 
that had to be formally finalized to be 
consummated. 
Rand-Whitney. 651 F. Supp. at 535. 
When the controlling law is applied to the facts of this 
case, the existence of a sufficiently definite agreement is 
obvious. The January 10, 1991 letter confirms the purpose, 
subject and essential terms of the agreement of the parties with 
more than adequate detail. The agreement is for the sale of the 
assets and liabilities of the MRC Division of GenBio for 
$500,000. Those assets and liabilities, as of January 10, 1991, 
are clearly ascertainable. Separate books and records were kept 
on the MRC Division. Moreover, at the time Defendant GenBio 
began its efforts to sell the MRC division, it had documents 
prepared that detailed the assets and liabilities thereof, which 
GenBio sent to potential purchasers at Gephart's direction so 
that the purchasers would know what was for sale. Those 
documents were regularly updated, and copies were given to 
Yarter, Condie and Gephart. 
The purchase price for the sale of the assets and liabil-
ities is specified, as are the payment terms. The purchase price 
is $500,000, with $400,000 to be paid at the time of closing and 
installment payments of $75,000 and $25,000 to be paid within 120 
days of closing, as agreed by the parties. 
The essential terms of this agreement are set forth with at 
least as much specificity as in Barker, Blachurst or Rand-
Whitney. The letters confirming the agreement plainly provide 
sufficient information for the parties to understand what their 
obligations are, and for the Court to compel a specific per-
formance or fashion an appropriate remedy in the event of a 
breach. Consequently, the agreement satisfies the requirements 
of a sufficiently definite contract. Based on the express 
language of the January 10, 1991 letter confirming the agreement 
of the parties, it is evident that the trial court erred in 
ruling that as matter of law the agreement of the parties was not 
sufficiently definite to constitute a contract. Accordingly, 
this Court should reverse the trial court, holding that the 
agreement of the parties is sufficiently definite to constitute 
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a contract. 
IV. 
THE COURT SHOULD SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE TRIAL COURTS 
INCONSISTENT FINDINGS OF FACT. 
If the Court does not find that Gephart had the apparent 
authority to enter the subject contract, then the Court should 
set aside the Judgment and remand the case for a new trial 
because the findings of fact entered by the trial court are 
completely inconsistent and cannot support the judgment. In 
entering the findings of fact on Plaintiff's Complaint, the court 
found that Mr. Gephart did not exercise control over GenBio and, 
thus, did not have apparent authority to enter the contract for 
the purchase and sale of the MRC Division. But in entering the 
findings of fact on Defendants' Counterclaim, the court made 
numerous findings that Mr. Gephart controlled GenBio and treated 
it as his own company. See Ruling on Proposed Findings and 
Objections, JI 3-10, 23, 28-29 and 34 (R. 1584-1603). 
The major issue raised by Defendants in this case is that 
Gephart did not have the authority to bind GenBio to a contract 
for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division. The trial court, 
however, has entered findings of fact on this very issue which 
are so inconsistent with each other that the judgment must fail. 
Because it is not possible for this Court to determine what the 
trial court intended to find, the findings of fact are insuf-
ficient to support the judgment of the trial court and this Court 
must remand this case for a new trial. 
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In Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that 
[t]he importance of complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact in a case tried 
by a judge is essential to the resolution of 
dispute under the proper rule of law. . . . 
Unless findings of fact meet such standards, 
application of the proper rule of law is 
difficult, if not impossible, and the re-
viewing function of this Court is seriously 
undermined. 
Id. at 1338-39 (emphasis added). See also Woodward v. Fazzio, 
823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
[W]hen findings of fact by a trial court are 
either so inconsistent or so confusing, 
vague or indefinite that this Court cannot 
determine the facts of the trial court 
intended to find, such findings are insuf-
ficient to support a judgment. 
Hawkins v. Teeoles & Thatcher, Inc.. 515 P.2d 927, 931 (Or. 1973) 
(emphasis added). See also Ierulli v. Lutz Dev. Co. . 698 P.2d 
504, 506 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). In Hawkins, which involved a 
breach of contract action, there was a basic inconsistency in the 
findings by the trial court in that the trial court found that 
the plaintiff had either substantially performed the contract or 
had a valid excuse for failing to do so, such as by a wrongful 
termination of the contract by defendant. On the other hand, the 
trial court entered a finding for defendant on its counterclaim 
that there was a material breach of the contract by plaintiffs 
and that the defendant had substantially performed the contract. 
As the court stated, lf[s]uch a finding, however, is completely 
inconsistent with the previous finding that defendant violated 
the contract by wrongfully terminating it, as necessary to 
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support the previous finding of the trial court in favor of 
plaintiffs on its complaint." Hawkins, 515 P. 2d at 932. In 
holding that the findings were insufficient to support the 
judgment, the court further stated: 
Because, however, the findings in this case 
are so inconsistent and confusing that we 
cannot determine what the trial court in-
tended to find, they are insufficient to 
support the judgment of the trial court in 
this case. It follows that we must either 
remand for further findings by the trial 
court or remand for a new trial. . . . In 
other cases, however, we have been critical 
of that practice and have preferred to 
remand cases for a new trial. 
Id. If the court cannot reconcile the inconsistent findings of 
fact, the court must then remand the case to the trial court for 
a new trial. Paul v. Kuntz, 524 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1988). 
In the present case, this Court cannot reconcile the trial 
court's inconsistent findings of fact. On the one hand, the 
court found no facts which evidenced Gephart's control over 
GenBio and his apparent authority to enter the subject contract. 
Based on these lack of findings, the court entered judgment 
against C&Y corporation on its complaint. On the other hand, in 
denying the Defendants' Counterclaim, the court found numerous 
instances in which Gephart exercised considerable control over 
GenBio and which plainly evidence Gephart's apparent authority, 
and in which GenBio acquiesced and invited. The court found as 
follows: 
3. The history of the operations of GenBio 
are that there was very little consideration 
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of shareholders' interests in the operation 
of GenBio and that GenBio was not run in the 
manner consistent for providing shareholder 
information. 
4. At no time has GenBio ever conducted 
any shareholders' meetings and there have 
been no election of directors by the share-
holders in the history of the corporation, 
5. Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen exercised a 
great deal of control over the GenBio board 
of directors in the operation of GenBio, 
however, this influence did not rise to the 
level of being a violation of law. 
6. With the exception of Mr. Condie, all 
of the GenBio directors were either em-
ployees of Ventana, consultants who had a 
relationship with Ventana, shareholders with 
another portfolio company of Ventana, or 
GenBio employees. The appointment of all 
directors were at the direction of Mr. 
Gephart or Mr. Townsen. Mr. Gephart or Mr. 
Townsen controlled who subsequent directors 
would be and controlled the appointment of 
the directors in this case. 
7. Many of the decisions to hire key 
personnel, rather than being made by the 
GenBio board of directors independently, 
were made either by Mr. Gephart or Mr. 
Townsen. Mr. Gordy. who was hired as pres-
ident, was instructed to talk to Mr. Gephart 
and Mr. Townsen rather than deal with Mr. 
Monson. who was the CEO of GenBio. At this 
time. Mr. Gephart was neither a director nor 
an officer of GenBio. 
8. When there was a dispute between the 
officers, it was Mr. Gephart who was in-
volved in the resolution of the dispute, not 
the board of directors. This included a 
dispute between Mr. Yarter and Mr. Monson, 
which resulted in the decision to terminate 
Mr. Monson. This decision was made by Mr. 
Gephart and not the board of directors. 
9. In considering the evidence adduced on 
whether Mr. Gephart or the board made this 
decision, and the testimony of Mr. Gephart 
and what has happened in GenBio in general. 
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the Court has serious reservations on the 
credibility of Mr, Gephart's testimony, Mr, 
Gephart had substantial influence in the 
operation of GenBio, but has little, if no, 
recollection on what has occurred. 
10. Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen had a great 
deal of control in the decision when to 
recall loans and the time of payments, 
rather than the GenBio board of directors, 
or independent officers, being able to 
control when money was sent. The decisions 
to recall loans and the timing of payments 
were made in the best interest of Ventana. 
rather than the best interest of GenBio. 
23. During the November 30, 1989 board 
meeting, the board of directors gave Mr. 
Gordy approval to sell MRC for $500,000 or 
more and that Mr. Gordy would receive a 5% 
commission for the sale of the MRC Division. 
Mr. Gephart and Mr, Townsen also gave their 
approval to sell the MRC Division prior to 
the November 30, 1989 meeting. 
28. Although Mr. Gephart did not have 
actual authority to sell MRC, he had sub-
stantial knowledge of GenBio and the MRC 
Division and was involved in negotiations to 
sell the MRC Division, even though he was 
not a member of the GenBio board. 
29. Other efforts to sell the MRC Division 
include negotiations with Dr. Dorsett. Dr. 
Dorsett initially contacted Mr. Townsen. but 
Mr. Townsen referred him to Mr. Gephart. 
34. The MRC Division clearly was for sale 
beginning in November of 1989. Prior ap-
proval of that sale also had been obtained 
from both Mr. Gephart and Mr, Townsen prior 
to it going to the board of directors for 
approval, 
Ruling on Proposed Findings and Objections, ff 3-10, 23, 28-29, 
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34 (R. 1592-97) (emphasis added). 
The clear weight of the evidence admitted at trial was that 
in all instances in which persons were interested in purchasing 
the MRC Division, GenBio instructed all of those persons to deal 
with Gephart. But Gephart was neither a director nor an officer 
of GenBio during any of these discussions. Because of the 
control which Gephart exercised over GenBio, both through funding 
and a control of the voting stock, GenBio not only acquiesced in 
Gephart's control, but invited it. 
These express factual findings of control plainly are 
inconsistent with the court's finding that Mr. Gephart did not 
have apparent authority to bind GenBio for the purchase and sale 
of the MRC Division. Because the findings of fact entered by the 
trial court are so inconsistent, it is not possible to determine 
what facts the court intended to find and the findings of fact 
cannot support the judgment. Accordingly, unless the Court 
reverses the trial court's finding of no apparent authority and 
enters its own finding of apparent authority, this Court must 
remand this case for a new trial. 
CONCLDSION 
For the reasons stated in Points I, II, III and IV above, 
plaintiffs/appellants respectfully request that this Court: 
1. Set aside the trial court's clearly erroneous finding 
that C&Y Corporation's offer of $500,000 to purchase the MRC 
Division, with $400,000 down and the remainder within 120 days, 
did not constitute a cash offer, and enter its own finding that 
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C&Y Corporation's offer was a cash offer; 
2. Reverse the trial court's determination that Gephart 
did not have the apparent authority to enter the subject 
contract, and direct the trial court to enter its conclusion of 
law that Gephart did have the apparent authority to bind GenBio 
to the subject contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC 
Division; and 
3. Reverse the trial court's determination that the 
agreement between the parties was not sufficiently definite to 
constitute a contract, and direct the trial court to enter its 
conclusion of law that the parties had agreed to the essential 
terms and that the agreeement was sufficiently definite to 
constitute a contract. 
4. Set aside the trial court's judgment and remand the 
case for a new trial if the Court does not find that Gephart had 
the apparent authority to enter the subject contract; 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 14th day of June 1994. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 14th day of June 1994, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF were 
sent first class United States Mail, postage prepaid, to each of 
the following: 
Mary Anne Q. Wood, Esq. 
Anthony B. Quinn, Esq. 
WOOD SPENDLOVE & QUINN 
60 East South Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul M. Durham, Esq. 
DURHAM EVANS & JONES 
50 South Main Street, #850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Dated this day of June, 
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Tab A 
B R I G H T O N H O S P I T A L I T Y G R O U P 
January 7t 1991 
Thomas Gebhart 
Ventana Growth Fund 
Oear Thomas, 
Our group has authorized me to accept your offer to sale to us the assets 
of HRC from GenBio for S500•000.00. Our purchase will be as follows: 
A. Purchase price 
B. Cash • Upon closing 
C. *f& days after closing 
D. 120 days after closing 
S 500,000.00 
$-3i&T«^00 iOPprC 
$ 7Sf0C0.00 
S 25,000.00 
It is necessary to have written acknowledgement of our agreement by 
Friday, January llth. 'Joon receipt of this acknowledgement, I will have our 
attorneys draw uo a written contract of purchase, 
n 
Yours truly, 
Rbbert A. Condie 
RAC/km 
130 Sou* 400 East. Suae 116 
Sa*Ufc£Gnr.Uaft M i l l 
nioaeiJOhS2M350 
Fax HOUitJ-tSSS 
TabB 
D Via Facsimile: (SOI) 363-1588 
vervcns 
January 10f 1991 
Mr. Robert Condie 
BRIGHTON HOSPTTALITY GROUP 
50 South 400 East 
Suite 116 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dtzi Bob: 
Pursuant to your January 7 correspondence and to our telephone conversation yesterday 
afternoon, 1 would like to provide a written acknowledgement of the agreement regarding 
the sale of assets and liabilities of MRC from GenBio for $500,000. As I mentioned, we 
generally agree with your proposal. 
Please note, however, that the capital amounts in Sections (B)v (C) and (D) of your proposal 
only total 5450,000. In this regard, I would like to modify section (B) to be increased to 
$400,000 - instead of S350,000 - to that the total will add up to the enure £500,000. .1 
will plan to take this proposal to the GenBio Board of Directors within the next week, to 
receive formal approval. 
I will look forward to speaking with you shortly. 
Sincerely yours, 
VENTANA 
Thomas O. Gephart 
Managing Partner 
TOG/kk 
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